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1745 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PUSH FOR 
TRANSPARENCY IN LOWER COURT  
APPOINTMENTS IN JAPAN 
DANIEL H. FOOTE

 
The theme of this symposium issue is ―Decision Making on the 
Japanese Supreme Court.‖ From that title, readers understandably might 
assume the focus is squarely on decisions in judicial cases. Yet, as 
Lawrence Repeta observes in his Article for this issue, the Japanese 
Supreme Court bears responsibility for another major category of decision 
making: judicial administration.
1
 One vitally important aspect of judicial 
administration for which the Supreme Court bears primary responsibility 
is the selection of lower court judges, together with personnel management 
of judges (including decisions on promotions and transfers, which are a 
standard element of Japan’s career judiciary).2 The Supreme Court’s role 
in the lower court appointment process, and recent reforms designed to 
heighten transparency in that process, are the topics of this essay. 
The basic outline of the lower court appointment process is widely 
known. Yet the actual operation of that process has been shrouded in 
secrecy. Based largely on analysis of the structure and organization of the 
Japanese judiciary, coupled with anecdotal evidence, for many years 
critics have charged the Supreme Court with stifling judicial independence 
by utilizing its control of the appointment process and personnel 
management in a politically motivated fashion or to compel adherence to 
certain norms.
3
 The Supreme Court, however, steadfastly has refused to 
divulge specific reasons for decisions on appointments or personnel 
management. In the absence of any such concrete information, the debate 
 
 
  Professor of Law, The University of Tokyo. 
 1. Lawrence Repeta, Reserved Seats on Japan’s Supreme Court, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1713 
(2011). For an examination of the Supreme Court’s role in judicial administration by a former Chief 
Justice, see Takaaki Hattori, The Role of the Supreme Court of Japan in the Field of Judicial 
Administration, 60 WASH. L. REV. 69 (1984). 
 2. John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public 
Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 99, 102–05 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007). 
 3. See, e.g., MIYAMOTO YASUAKI, KIKI NI TATSU SHIHŌ [JUDICIARY IN CRISIS] (Chōbunsha, 
1978) (account by former assistant judge who was denied reappointment); Masaki Abe, The Internal 
Control of a Bureaucratic Judiciary: The Case of Japan, 23 INT’L J. SOC. & LAW 303, 303–20 (1995); 
Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative Control of Japanese Judges, in LAW AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE 
PACIFIC COMMUNITY 263 (Philip S.C. Lewis ed., 1994); David M. O’Brien & Yasuo Ohkoshi, Stifling 
Judicial Independence from Within: The Japanese Judiciary, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE 
OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 37 (Peter H. Russell & David 
M. O’Brien eds., 2001). 
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over judicial independence seemed destined to proceed endlessly, with 
charges based heavily on anecdotal evidence met by virtually complete 
silence.  
Then, by the early 1990s, J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric Rasmusen 
devised an ingenious strategy for testing the assertions statistically. They 
compiled an extensive database—initially for the cohort of all judges 
appointed during the decade of the 1960s—containing, among other 
matters: age, gender, university education and other demographic 
information; information on productivity and participation in reported 
judgments for various types of cases; and information on positions held 
throughout the course of their careers in the judiciary.
4
 Then, using 
regression analysis, they sought to identify which factors displayed 
statistically significant correlations with more successful and less 
successful careers (defined in accordance with pay scales and other widely 
accepted notions of what positions within the Japanese career judiciary are 
more or less desirable).
5
 Over the years, Ramseyer and his collaborators 
(usually Rasmusen and, at times, Frances Rosenbluth, with additional 
works by Ramseyer on his own) have expanded greatly the cohort of 
judges covered and types of data collected and examined, have refined 
their analysis, and, in a book
6
 and numerous articles in English and in 
Japanese, have investigated an ever-widening set of topics.
7
 
Ramseyer’s article in this issue, Do School Cliques Dominate Japanese 
Bureaucracies?: Evidence from Supreme Court Appointments, takes the 
analysis one step further, by examining whether school cliques and 
favoritism toward the graduates of elite universities—namely, the 
University of Tokyo and Kyoto University—explain why judges who 
graduated from those universities dominate in appointments to the 
Supreme Court. Having served as professor at the University of Tokyo for 
over ten years, I am gratified to see the results of this latest investigation. 
 
 
 4. J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN, at xii, 26–47 (2003).  
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See, e.g., J. Mark Ramseyer, Predicting Court Outcomes through Political Preferences: The 
Japanese Supreme Court and the Chaos of 1993, 58 DUKE L.J. 1557 (2009); J. Mark Ramseyer, The 
Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1994); J. Mark 
Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidence from 
Japan, 13 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 259 (1997); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, The Case for 
Managed Judges: Learning from Japan after the Political Upheaval of 1993, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1879 
(2006); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in 
Politically Charged Cases?, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 331 (2001); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. 
Rasmussn, Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate so High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (2001); J. Mark 
Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why the Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses, 72 S. CAL. L.J. 571 (1999). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/15
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Most of my students, especially those who pass the bar exam at a young 
age, are intelligent, committed, and hard working. Of course, I would like 
to think the education the University of Tokyo provides has something to 
do with their success. But the top University of Tokyo students are blessed 
with natural ability and a strong level of dedication. So, while I have a 
number of caveats and concerns with regard to Ramseyer’s analysis, I’m 
more than inclined to be persuaded by his conclusion: ―[There is] no 
evidence of favoritism toward the graduates of the preeminent University 
of Tokyo. Elite university graduates do not dominate Supreme Court 
appointments because of their school backgrounds. They dominate 
because they produce.‖8 I’m happy to see him offer empirical confirmation 
for that conclusion. 
Over the years, Ramseyer and his collaborators have expended vast 
amounts of time and energy compiling and analyzing data. Their work 
would be a valuable resource even if more concrete information were 
available regarding specific appointment and personnel decisions. Yet, if 
the Supreme Court had been more forthcoming with concrete information, 
it is hard to imagine they would have felt the need to invest so much time 
and energy in this project. In that sense, the very existence of their 
research serves as a reminder of the lack of transparency in the judicial 
appointment process.  
Not surprisingly, the response of the Japanese Supreme Court to the 
work of Ramseyer and his collaborators has been essentially the same as 
its response to other critiques of the appointment and personnel 
management process for lower court judges: silence. While a few 
individual judges have expressed their views to Ramseyer in private,
9
 the 
Supreme Court has not commented publicly. To the contrary, the Supreme 
Court has maintained its steadfast policy of near total secrecy with regard 
to appointments and personnel matters.  
As Repeta observed in his oral presentation at the symposium, 
however, ―[I]n recent years, increased transparency has been a constant 
theme of reform demands for all aspects of government in Japan.‖10 The 
judicial appointment process is no exception. In 1999, the government of 
Japan established the Justice System Reform Council (―Reform Council‖), 
 
 
 8. J. Mark Ramseyer, Do School Cliques Dominate Japanese Bureaucracies?: Evidence from 
Supreme Court Appointments, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1681 (2011). 
 9. E-mail from J. Mark Ramseyer, Mitsubishi Professor of Japanese Legal Studies, Harvard 
Law School (Dec. 29, 2010) (on file with author). 
 10. Lawrence Repeta, Address at the Washington University Law Review Symposium: Decision 
Making on the Japanese Supreme Court, September 10, 2010; see also Repeta, supra note 1.  
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a body of thirteen knowledgeable members from a wide range of fields, 
charged with ―clarifying the role to be played by justice in Japanese 
society . . . and examining and deliberating fundamental measures 
necessary for the realization‖ of a justice system appropriate for the needs 
of Japanese society.
11
 The Reform Council issued its final 
recommendations in June 2001.
12
 A central theme of those 
recommendations was the need for greater transparency throughout the 
justice system. With reference to appointments to the Supreme Court, the 
Reform Council observed, in a bit of an understatement, that ―the 
processes for nomination by the Cabinet and for appointment are not 
necessarily transparent.‖13 The Reform Council stopped short of offering 
any concrete recommendations for reforming the Supreme Court 
appointment process, though, stating only that: 
[F]rom the standpoint of strengthening the people’s confidence in 
the justices of the Supreme Court, studies should be made on 
appropriate mechanisms for the purpose of securing transparency 
and objectivity with regard to the appointment process, while 
paying due respect to the importance of the position [of Supreme 
Court justice].
14
 
As discussed below, the Reform Council offered much more explicit 
recommendations with respect to reforming the appointment process for 
lower court judges, and the Supreme Court acted on those 
recommendations rather expeditiously. Before examining the reforms and 
evaluating their impact, however, a brief explanation is in order of the 
lower court judicial appointment process as it existed previously. 
 
 
 11. Shihō seido kaikaku shingikai setchihō [Justice System Reform Council Establishment Act], 
Law No. 68 of 1999, art. 2. For an overview of the Justice System Reform Council and its 
recommendations, see Daniel H. Foote, Introduction and Overview: Japanese Law at a Turning Point, 
in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT, at xix (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007). 
 12. SHIHŌ SEIDO KAIKAKU SHINGIKAI [JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL], SHIHŌ SEIDO 
KAIKAKU SHINGIKAI IKENSHO—21 SEIKI NO NIHON O SASAERU SHIHŌ SEIDO [RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL—A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY] (2001), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html 
[hereinafter REFORM COUNCIL RECOMMENDATIONS]. 
 13. Id. at 77. 
 14. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/15
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OVERVIEW OF THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS FOR LOWER COURT JUDGES
15
 
In Japan’s career judiciary, the vast majority of judges16 commence 
their judicial careers with appointment to ten-year terms as assistant 
judges, immediately upon completion of training at the Legal Training and 
Research Institute (LTRI).
17
 Each year, a new cohort of assistant judges is 
appointed. Between 1970 and 2002 (after which the reforms discussed 
below began), the number of newly appointed assistant judges ranged 
from a low of 57 to a high of 112.
18
 Under the Constitution of Japan, lower 
court judges must stand for reappointment every ten years.
19
 The great 
majority of judges seek reappointment, but some decline to do so or resign 
from the judiciary; and at least some of those who have left the judiciary 
evidently have done so after being advised they might face difficulty 
securing reappointment.
20
 Until recently, however, virtually all those who 
 
 
 15. Almost certainly the most extensive examination to date of the Japanese judicial selection 
system is Ii Takayuki, Saibankan sennin seido no saiteii: Nihon ni okeru meritto serekushon no keiju 
to hen’yō [Repositioning the Judicial Selection System: Japan’s Reception and Transformation of 
Merit Selection] (Mar. 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Waseda University School of Law) 
[hereinafter Ii, Judicial Selection]. Ii has summarized key aspects of his research and findings in a 
recent article in English. Takayuki Ii, Japanese Way of Judicial Appointment and Its Impact on 
Judicial Review, 5 NAT’L TAIWAN UNIV. L. REV. 73 (2010), available at http://www.law.ntu.edu.tw/ 
ntulawreview/articles/5-2/03-Article-Takayuki%20Ii.pdf [hereinafter Ii, Japanese Way]. Other 
noteworthy examinations of the lower court appointment process and judicial career system (in 
English) include: Abe, supra note 3; Miyazawa, supra note 3; O’Brien & Ohkoshi, supra note 3; 
RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, supra note 6, at 7–15; and Haley, supra note 2, at 102–05. 
 16. Ever since its enactment in 1947, the Courts Act has authorized the appointment as judges of 
those possessing over ten years of experience as prosecutors, lawyers, or legal academics, Saibanshohō 
[Courts Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 42. Traditionally, it has been very rare for lawyers, not to 
mention prosecutors or academics, to enter the judiciary; and, despite recent efforts to invigorate the 
process for recruiting lawyers as judges, the number of lawyers entering the judiciary remains low. For 
a discussion of these efforts, see Daniel H. Foote, Recent Reforms to the Japanese Judiciary: Real 
Change or Mere Appearance?, 66 HŌSHAKAIGAKU 128, 134–40 (2007). 
 17. In Japan, those who have passed the bar exam must complete an additional legal training 
program, currently one year in duration, prior to entering the legal profession. The program includes 
two months of instruction at the LTRI, a body under the aegis of the Supreme Court, and ten months of 
―practical training‖ (jitsumu shūshū, frequently translated into English as ―apprenticeship training‖) in 
courts, prosecutors’ offices, and law firms. 
 18. See Ii, Japanese Way, supra note 15, at 85–86. 
 19. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 80, sec. 1. 
 20. According to a summary of the judicial appointment system prepared by the Supreme Court 
for presentation to the Reform Council:  
The great majority of assistant judges with ten years of experience . . . seek appointment as 
judges; and nearly all of them are appointed as judges. When an assistant judge seeks 
appointment as judge, but, based on his/her performance as assistant judge, health condition, 
or other factors the prospects for appointment as judge are low, it is customary to advise the 
candidate in advance; and it is rare for such a candidate to pursue appointment to the end, 
which would result in so-called denial of reappointment. 
Saikōsaibansho [Supreme Court], Saibankan seido no kaikaku ni tsuite [On the Reform of the Judicial 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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elected to remain in the judiciary have been reappointed for successive 
ten-year terms, up until mandatory retirement at age 65.
21
  
Pursuant to the Constitution of Japan, which was adopted in 1947, 
―[t]he judges of the inferior courts shall be appointed by the Cabinet from 
a list of persons nominated by the Supreme Court.‖22 This provision was 
shaped by the Constitution drafting committee of the General 
Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ) 
and bore a strong U.S. influence.
23
 The drafters evidently viewed this 
provision as ensuring judicial independence by granting to the Supreme 
Court primary authority to prepare the list of candidates, while at the same 
time ensuring political input into the selection process by entrusting 
ultimate authority for appointment to the Cabinet and by requiring lower 
court judges to stand for reappointment every ten years.
24
  
Prior drafts of the above provision would have ensured an even greater 
role for the Cabinet in selecting judges. According to one early draft, the 
government would choose judges from a list of at least four candidates for 
every vacancy, at least two of whom would be nominated by the Supreme 
Court and two more nominated in a manner designated by the Diet.
25
 
According to a somewhat later draft (the draft the GHQ initially submitted 
to the Japanese government), the Cabinet would choose judges from a list 
of at least two candidates for every vacancy, with those candidates to be 
nominated by the Supreme Court.
26
 Thus, the GHQ evidently envisioned a 
procedure similar to the so-called Missouri Plan or merit selection plan in 
the United States, in which a nominating committee screens candidates for 
suitability and compiles a list containing the names of multiple candidates 
 
 
System] 8 (Feb. 19, 2001) (unpublished paper presented at 48th meeting of Reform Council), 
[hereinafter Reform Council paper], available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai48/ 
pdfs/48bessi3.pdf. Similarly, the summary reports that, while ―matters relating to personnel 
management have been treated as secret,‖ in the case of judges facing reappointment, ―as a form of 
advice, it has not been uncommon to point out to judges issues with regard to their performance of 
duties or prospects for reappointment well in advance of the time for reappointment,‖ while 
acknowledging that ―this has not always been done.‖ Id. at 14.  
 21. See Ii, Japanese Way, supra note 15, at 84–86. As Ramseyer explains in his article in this 
volume, a select few career judges cap off their judicial careers with appointment to the Supreme 
Court, for which the mandatory retirement age is 70. J. Mark Ramseyer, Do School Cliques Dominate 
Japanese Bureaucracies?: Evidence From Supreme Court Appointments, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1681 
(2011).  
 22. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 80, sec. 1 (emphasis added). 
 23. Ii, Judicial Selection, supra note 15, at 78–82.  
 24. Id.; see also DANIEL H. FOOTE, NA MO NAI KAO MO NAI SHIHÔ: NIHON NO SAIBAN WA 
KAWARU NO KA [NAMELESS FACELESS JUSTICE: WILL JAPAN’S COURTS CHANGE?] 70–71, 90–91 
(Masayuki Tamaruya trans., 2007) . 
 25. Ii, Judicial Selection, supra note 15, at 81; see also FOOTE, supra note 24, at 90–91. 
 26. See Ii, Japanese Way, supra note 15, at 81, and sources cited therein.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/15
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for each vacancy, from which the responsible political authority (typically 
the governor or state legislature) selects one person for appointment as 
judge.
27
  
Apart from a brief period immediately after the Supreme Court was 
established in 1947,
28
 actual practice has been far different from the 
envisioned approach. In a report prepared for the Reform Council, the 
Supreme Court explained actual nomination practice in the following 
manner: 
With respect to designation of candidates for appointment as lower 
court judges, the Supreme Court, at the Judicial Conference, 
determines those persons who are suitable for appointment as 
judges, from among those who have attained the qualifications for 
appointment as specified in the Courts Act and who have indicated 
their desire to be appointed, and sends the list of their names to the 
Cabinet. 
 A separate list is prepared for each category of positions to be 
filled. As to the number of persons to be listed, there is no provision 
stipulating whether it is sufficient for the list to contain exactly the 
same number of names as the number of positions to be filled, or 
whether a greater number of names must be included on the list. In 
practice, in accordance with custom, . . . in the cases of appointment 
of High Court presidents, judges, and assistant judges, a list is 
prepared that contains one name more than the number of positions 
to be filled. Then, red circles are affixed next to the names of those 
candidates deemed suitable by the Supreme Court . . . . In the case 
of reappointment, apart from including a notation of the end of the 
period of appointment, the same procedure is followed.
29
 
Thus, for example, in a year in which sixty-five new assistant judges 
were to be appointed, the Supreme Court would have prepared and 
submitted to the Cabinet a list of sixty-six names, with red circles next to 
the names of the desired sixty-six.
30
 
 
 
 27. Ii, Judicial Selection, supra note 15, at 80–81 (citing JOANNE MARTIN, MERIT SELECTION 
COMMISSIONS: WHAT DO THEY DO? HOW EFFECTIVE ARE THEY? 1–23 (1993); CHARLES H. 
SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL 
JUDGES 125–45 (1997)); see also FOOTE, supra note 24, at 89–90 (citing Larry C. Berkson, Judicial 
Selection in the United States: A Special Report, 64 JUDICATURE 176 (1980)). 
 28. Ii, supra note 15, at 86–87 & n.36. 
 29. Reform Council paper, supra note 20, at 8. 
 30. In Japan, a red circle is a sign of approval.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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As the above summary notes, responsibility for compiling the list of 
candidates rests with the Judicial Conference—that is, the conference of 
all fifteen Supreme Court Justices.
31
 Review by the Judicial Conference 
evidently is not a complete formality. In recently published memoirs, 
former Justice Takii Shigeo, who served from 2002 to 2006, reported that 
during his tenure on the Court, ―there were occasions on which [the 
Judicial Conference] spent time discussing such matters as judicial pay, 
the saiban’in (lay participation) system, and initial appointments and 
reappointments of judges.‖32 As Takii made clear, though, such discussions 
were an unusual occurrence: 
 With respect to personnel [and other] matters, individual justices 
lack sufficient information to express an opinion regarding most 
proposals . . . . Of course, if justices have doubts regarding a certain 
matter, they are in a position to demand and receive an explanation. 
Yet, given the fact that proposals have gone through many stages of 
consideration before being scheduled for discussion, it would seem 
irresponsible to engage in seemingly spur-of-the-moment debate 
without reviewing all the developments to date, so justices often 
hesitate to speak.
33
  
Elsewhere, moreover, Takii reported, ―The Supreme Court General 
Secretariat prepares proposals relating to personnel [and other] matters 
. . . . These proposals are discussed at the Judicial Conference, but the 
reality is that they are approved in nearly the same form as the proposal. I 
cannot recall an instance in which a proposal was revised at the Judicial 
Conference.‖34 Other accounts confirm the very limited role played by the 
Judicial Conference in the nomination process.
35
 In practice, it is the 
Supreme Court General Secretariat that has conducted the screening and 
has prepared the lists of assistant judges and judges for nomination, and 
the Judicial Conference simply confirms those lists.
36
  
As to the criteria used in selecting candidates, in its report to the 
Reform Council, the Supreme Court provided the following explanation: 
 
 
 31. The Judicial Conference’s responsibility for matters of judicial administration is codified in 
Saibanshohō [Courts Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 12. 
 32. TAKII SHIGEO, SAIKŌSAIBANSHO WA KAWATTA KA—ICHI SAIBANKAN NO JIKO KENSHŌ [HAS 
THE SUPREME COURT CHANGED?—SELF-EXAMINATION BY ONE JUSTICE] 37 (Iwanami Shoten, 2009) 
(emphasis added). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 17. 
 35. E.g., Ii, Japanese Way, supra note 15, at 83–88, and sources cited therein. 
 36. Ii, Judicial Selection, supra note 15, at 84. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/15
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As attributes and abilities necessary for lower court judges, we 
might list, first of all, a high level of ability and judgment (shikiken) 
as a jurist (hōritsuka). It goes without saying that, for a judge, above 
all one must possess expert knowledge and ability of both a 
theoretical and practical nature necessary for determining facts, 
interpreting and applying law, and disposing of cases . . . . That 
said, one cannot say definitively the precise level of ability that is 
required; and when it comes to the matter of judgment, a very wide 
range of factors must be considered on a comprehensive basis, 
including breadth of vision resting on broad-based education, 
insight into human nature, and understanding of societal 
phenomena, for starters. In addition, with respect to character and 
personality, evaluation is undertaken from a broad range of 
perspectives relating to matters such as integrity, fairness, open-
mindedness, patience, decisiveness, prudence, care, independent 
spirit, spiritual courage, cooperativeness, drive, etc . . . . It is by no 
means easy, however, to grasp as objectively as possible and assess 
comprehensively attributes and abilities involving many aspects of 
character. It is for reasons such as this that the Supreme Court has, 
up to now, taken the position that the standard for appointment of 
judges is whether, based on a comprehensive assessment of ability, 
character, etc., the person is deemed suitable to serve as a judge.
37
  
RECENT REFORMS TO THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS FOR  
LOWER COURT JUDGES 
The Reform Council expressed reservations regarding the appointment 
process. In its final recommendations, the Council observed: ―[t]he 
Cabinet appoints judges for the lower courts based on a list of persons 
nominated by the Supreme Court. . . . However, [under the existing 
system] the process by which the Supreme Court nominates candidates is 
not necessarily clear, and the views of the people cannot penetrate that 
process.‖38 To meet these concerns, the Council announced, as broad goals 
for reform, ―reflecting public views . . . in the process of appointing judges 
and . . . secur[ing] transparency and objectivity of personnel 
evaluations.‖ 39  The Council then set out the following concrete 
 
 
 37. Reform Council paper, supra note 20, at 12. 
 38. REFORM COUNCIL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11, at 95 (page number based on original 
Japanese text). 
 39. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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recommendations for achieving those goals: ―[To] strengthen[] the 
[public] confidence of the people toward the judges, in order to reflect the 
views of the people in the [appointment process] . . . a body should be 
established in the Supreme Court, which, upon receiving consultations . . . 
selects appropriate candidates . . . and recommends the results . . . to the 
Supreme Court.‖40  Furthermore, ―mechanisms should be established to 
assure that the process is transparent, including disclosing the selection 
standards, procedures, schedule and other matters.‖41 
Acting on these recommendations, in 2003, the Supreme Court 
established the Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation Commission 
(Kakyūsaibansho saibankan shimei shimon iinkai) (―Consultation 
Commission‖ or ―Commission‖), an eleven-member body situated within 
the Supreme Court.
42
 Members are appointed by the Supreme Court, but 
most come from outside the judiciary. Currently, the Commission consists 
of two judges, two lawyers, one prosecutor, and six ―persons of learning 
and experience‖ from outside the legal profession (although one of those 
six, a legal academic, is former Supreme Court Justice Okuda 
Masamichi).
43
 The Commission is charged with reviewing candidates for 
appointment as assistant judges or judges and candidates for 
reappointment as judges, based on lists of candidates prepared by the 
Supreme Court General Secretariat, and reporting its views to the Supreme 
Court.
44
 The Commission is assisted by a general affairs section, staffed 
by members of the Supreme Court General Secretariat.
45
 In addition, to 
assist the Commission in gathering information regarding the candidates, 
eight regional bodies also were established, one in each of the eight high 
court jurisdictions.
46
  
 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. The Reform Council recommended other reforms to the judiciary, including measures 
intended to broaden the perspectives of judges, both by recruiting more judges at the mid-career level 
from among the ranks of experienced lawyers and by ensuring that all judges would spend a 
significant period of time outside the judiciary. Those reforms lie beyond the scope of this essay. For a 
discussion of those reforms and their impact, see Foote, supra note 16.  
 42. Kakyūsaibansho saibankan shimei shimon iinkai [Lower Court Judge Designation 
Consultation Commission], SAIKŌSAIBANSHO [SUPREME COURT], http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/ 
about/iinkai/kakyusaibansyo/ (last visited May 8, 2011). 
 43. Kakyūsaibansho saibankan shimei shimon iinkai meibo [List of Members, Lower Court 
Judge Designation Consultation Commission], SAIKŌSAIBANSHO [SUPREME COURT], http://www. 
courts.go.jp/saikosai/about/iinkai/kakyusaibansyo/iinmeibo_kakyuusaibansyo.html (last visited May 8, 
2011). 
 44. Kakyūsaibansho saibankan shimei shimon iinkai kisoku [Lower Court Judge Designation 
Consultation Commission Rules], Sup. Ct. Rule No. 6 of 2003, art. 2, available at http://www.courts. 
go.jp/kisokusyu/sonota_kisoku/sonota_kisoku_03.html. 
 45. Id. art. 18. 
 46. Id. arts. 12–16. 
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Minutes of the Consultation Commission’s meetings are published and 
available on the Internet, albeit in summarized form and without 
identifying the speakers by name.
47
 Even so, by carefully perusing the 
minutes, one can learn a good deal about the procedures followed by the 
Commission. In terms of overall process, the General Secretariat prepares 
reports on the candidates, and a five-member subcommittee of the 
Commission then reviews the candidates and reports back to the full 
Commission, which deliberates before finalizing its evaluations.
48
 For the 
appointment of new assistant judges, grades at the LTRI constitute a 
―major factor,‖ along with reports prepared by judges who serve as 
instructors at the LTRI.
49
 In the cases of promotion of assistant judges to 
judge status and reappointment of judges (which are treated together in the 
Commission proceedings and records, and hereinafter will be referred to 
collectively as ―reappointment of judges‖ or simply ―reappointments‖), 
―the Commission first separates out,‖ based primarily on reports prepared 
by the chief judges of the courts where the candidates have been stationed, 
―those candidates whose suitability is deemed to necessitate careful 
evaluation (priority review candidates) and then places special weight on 
the deliberations regarding those candidates.‖50 In addition to the reports 
prepared by other judges, the pool of available information with respect to 
the priority review candidates includes information collected by the 
regional committees from attorneys and prosecutors in the districts where 
the candidates have been serving. 
The summarized minutes also reveal the number of candidates that the 
Consultation Commission has judged to be suitable or unsuitable for 
appointment, as well as the number of those who have withdrawn their 
names from consideration. Over the first seven years since the 
Commission was instituted, it has found 770 of the applicants for new 
appointments as assistant judges to be suitable and 44 unsuitable, with 
 
 
 47. The summarized minutes and other materials are available at the Commission homepage, 
Kakyūsaibansho saibankan shimei shimon iinkai [Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation 
Commission], COURTS IN JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/about/iinkai/kakyusaibansyo/index. 
html (last visited May 17, 2011).  
 48. See Kakyūsaibansho saibankan shimei shimon iinkai [Lower Court Judge Designation 
Consultation Commission], Shimei no tekihi ni tsuite shingi suru tejun/hōhō ni tsuite (kentōyō 
tatakidai) [Regarding the Process and Methods for Deliberating with Respect to Suitability for 
Designation (Discussion Draft)], Shingi shiryō [Deliberation Materials] No. 4 for Meeting No. 2 (July 
1, 2003) [hereinafter Process and Methods], and summarized minutes for Meeting No. 2 (July 1, 2003) 
[hereinafter Summarized Minutes], available at http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/about/iinkai/kakyu 
saibansyo/index.html. 
 49. Process and Methods, supra note 48. 
 50. Id. 
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another 33 candidates reported to have withdrawn.
51
 With respect to 
reappointments, over the same period, the Commission has found 1277 
candidates suitable and 29 unsuitable, with another 8 reported as having 
withdrawn.
52
 While the Supreme Court is not legally bound to follow the 
views of the Commission in preparing the lists of candidates for 
appointment for submission to the Cabinet, it reportedly has done so in 
every case to date, with the exception of candidates who withdrew their 
names from consideration after Commission review.
53
  
The approval rates, nearly 95% in the case of new assistant judges and 
nearly 98% for reappointments, may seem high; but even so, the new 
system appears to be considerably stricter than in the past. In the fifteen 
years before the new system went into effect, only 9 out of over 1400 
applicants for appointments as assistant judges were rejected, and between 
1970 and 2002, only 3 judges who sought reappointment were rejected.
54
 
Just how much stricter is open to debate, however. Under the old system, 
only formal denials of appointment or reappointment were made public. If 
candidates withdrew their applications after being told privately that the 
Supreme Court could not support them, those cases never appeared in the 
public record. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in its summary to the 
Reform Council, in the past, the borderline candidates—the so-called 
priority review candidates under the new system—typically were 
informally advised not to seek reappointment, and thus would not have 
shown up in the denial statistics.
55
  
HAS TRANSPARENCY BEEN ACHIEVED? 
Determining whether the standards have changed—and, if so, why—is 
virtually impossible. Doing so would require comparing the standards and 
the manner in which they were applied under the old system and under the 
 
 
 51. Numbers for assistant judge appointments compiled from the summarized minutes for 
Meetings: No. 5 (Oct. 6, 2003), No. 11 (Oct. 4, 2004), No. 18 (Oct. 3, 2005), No. 24 (Oct. 2, 2006), 
No. 29 (Sept. 7, 2007), No. 31 (Dec. 21, 2007), No. 34 (Sept. 5, 2008), No. 36 (Dec. 19, 2008), No. 39 
(Sept. 8, 2009), and No. 41 (Dec. 19, 2009). Summarized Minutes, supra note 48. 
 52. Numbers for reappointments compiled from the summarized minutes for Meetings: No. 6 
(Dec. 2, 2003), No. 13 (Dec. 3, 2004), No. 16 (June 10, 2005), No. 19 (Dec. 9, 2005), No. 22 (July 7, 
2006), No. 25 (Dec. 8, 2006), No. 28 (June 29, 2007), No. 30 (Dec. 7, 2007), No. 35 (Dec. 5, 2008), 
and No. 40 (Dec. 1, 2009). Id. 
 53. Kimura Kiyoshi, Kakyūsaibansho saibankan shimei shimon iinkai seido no genjō to kongo no 
tenbō [The Current Status of the Lower Court Judge Designation Consultation Commission System 
and Prospects for the Future], 60 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 10, at 22, 25 (2009). 
 54. Ii, Japanese Way, supra note 15, at 84–86. 
 55. Id.; see supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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new system. As we have seen, under the old system, those matters were 
shrouded in secrecy. They still are.  
Shortly after it was established, the Commission released a ―discussion 
draft,‖ labeled as a ―rough policy‖ (ichiō no hōshin), of the standards to be 
used for determining suitability for appointment.
56
 Although somewhat 
longer than the Supreme Court’s summary to the Reform Council of the 
criteria for selection of judges,
57
 the standards announced by the 
Commission closely parallel those criteria.
58
 As with the earlier 
explanation, the standards remain at a rather high level of abstraction and 
list a very wide range of attributes, some of which, such as ―decisiveness‖ 
and ―cautiousness,‖ contrast sharply in meaning. This may be inevitable 
because the range of attributes relevant for selecting judges is broad and, 
depending on the context, some of those attributes may sound like near 
opposites. Yet, without further explanation or concrete examples, the 
standards announced by the Commission provide only a very generalized 
picture. And the Commission and Supreme Court have continued 
steadfastly to refuse to provide any further guidance regarding the 
standards applied. 
When it comes to the concrete application of the selection standards, 
the summarized minutes are totally pro forma in nature. In reporting the 
results of deliberations, the minutes routinely utilize the exact same 
formulaic language: ―A report was made on the results of consideration by 
the subcommittee. Based on [those results], deliberations were held on the 
suitability of candidates . . . . As a result, of the [X] candidates, [Y] were 
deemed suitable, [Z] were deemed unsuitable, and the determination on 
[W] candidates was deferred.‖ 59  No indication is given of how many 
candidates were designated as priority-review candidates, much less their 
names. Nor does the Commission ever disclose the grounds for 
determinations of unsuitability. From the summarized minutes, one cannot 
even tell how long either the subcommittee or the full Commission spent 
on the review and deliberations. Upon formal appointment by the Cabinet, 
 
 
 56. Kakyū saibansho saibankan shimei shimon iinkai [Lower Court Judge Designation 
Consultation Commission], Shimei shimon iinkai ni oite shimei no tekihi ni tsuite handan suru kijun ni 
tsuite (kentōyō tatakidai) [Regarding the Standards for Determining Suitability for Designation, for the 
Designation Consultation Commission (Discussion Draft)], Shingi shiryō [Deliberation Materials] No. 
6 for Meeting No. 3 (July 14, 2003) [hereinafter Standards], available at http://www.courts.go.jp/ 
saikosai/about/iinkai/kakyusaibansyo/index.html. 
 57. See supra text accompanying note 37.  
 58. For a more detailed discussion of the standards announced by the Commission, see Foote, 
supra note 16, at 144–46.  
 59. See, e.g., Summarized Minutes, supra note 48 (Meeting No. 5 (Oct. 6, 2003)).  
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the names of the appointees are announced.
60
 The Commission itself does 
not release the names of the candidates it has judged suitable, however, 
nor does the Commission ever announce the names of candidates judged 
unsuitable or those who have withdrawn from consideration. 
As the following examples reflect, on several occasions, the 
Consultation Commission and members of the Commission’s general 
affairs section (from the Supreme Court General Secretariat) have resisted 
efforts to obtain more detailed explanations regarding the standards 
applied and have expressed deep concern over revelations of even 
relatively limited information regarding concrete cases and over attempts 
to identify specific criteria for determinations of unsuitability.  
In 2003, a leak occurred, presumably at the regional committee level, 
through which a local bar association learned the number, but not the 
identity, of the ―priority review candidates‖ in that region.61 At a meeting 
in early 2004, a member of the general affairs section reported this matter 
to the Commission as a serious confidentiality concern and took the 
occasion to remind the Commission members of their sworn duty of 
confidentiality under the National Public Servants Act.
62
  
In that same meeting, the Consultation Commission considered a 
request, submitted in writing to the Commission chair by fourteen former 
trainees at the LTRI, seeking the disclosure of ―more concrete standards 
for suitability for appointment as assistant judges,‖ because, the former 
trainees stated, ―from the . . . policies disclosed heretofore in the 
summaries of the Commission’s proceedings, the standards for . . . 
suitability for appointment . . . are not clear.‖63 At least two Commission 
members voiced support for greater disclosure.
64
 Officials from the 
Supreme Court, however, opposed further disclosure.
65
 A member of the 
Commission’s general affairs section expressed concern over the 
possibility that Commission members might agree on the conclusion with 
regard to a given candidate but differ in their reasons, and reminded the 
Commission that in the past the Supreme Court’s standard approach ―has 
been to explain that the result reflects an assessment of the entire 
 
 
 60. Ii, supra note 15, at 100. To this author’s knowledge, as of this writing in March 2011, no 
case has been reported in which the Supreme Court has failed to abide by the Commission’s 
recommendation.  
 61. Summarized Minutes, supra note 48 (Meeting No. 8 (March 29, 2004)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Since the summarized minutes do not identify the speakers, one cannot tell their 
backgrounds.  
 65. Summarized Minutes, supra note 48 (Meeting No. 8 (March 29, 2004)). 
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person.‖66 Presumably with the Reform Council’s call for ―mechanisms to 
assure the process is transparent‖ in mind, he or she added, ―Does not the 
very fact this Commission was established constitute a response, in the 
sense that including knowledgeable persons from outside, in a process that 
previously had been handled as an internal judicial matter, has improved 
transparency?‖67  
A witness, an official from the Personnel Division of the Supreme 
Court General Secretariat,
68
 reiterated opposition to greater disclosure, 
stating:  
Grades are an important reflection of attributes and abilities. But it 
is extremely difficult to fix any absolute standard, even as a 
minimum cutoff. It would cause trouble if people get the sense it’s 
enough to satisfy that standard. Personal character is an extremely 
important factor, and this Commission cannot help but to evaluate 
character comprehensively, taking into account reports by LTRI 
instructors et al.
69
  
The chair, former Justice Okuda, concluded discussion of the topic by 
stating:  
The number of LTRI trainees will be shifting in the future, and 
disclosing standards to trainees seeking judicial appointments might 
tie our hands and reduce our ability to adapt. Wouldn’t it be wise to 
wait for a little while (mō sukoshi) to see how things develop? 
Disclosure of standards is a difficult issue, and so is disclosure of 
reasons [for determinations of unsuitability]. When a candidate’s 
health is such that he/she simply could not perform the duties, we 
can clearly state the reason is health-related. But when the reason 
rests on a combination of multiple factors, it is in a sense inevitable 
that any explanation turns into an abstract reference to attributes and 
abilities.
70
  
Okuda closed his comments by echoing the Supreme Court official’s 
interpretation of the concept of ―transparency,‖ stating, ―All we can do is 
 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. The list of attendees at Meeting No. 8, item 3 of the summarized minutes for that meeting, 
includes the witnesses who appeared at the meeting. According to that list, the only two witnesses who 
participated in that meeting were the head of the Personnel Division and a section head from the 
Personnel Division. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (emphasis added). 
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seek understanding that the establishment of this Commission serves as a 
systematic measure to assure transparency.‖71  
Notwithstanding Okuda’s reference to waiting ―a little while to see 
how things develop,‖ the passage of over five additional years evidently 
did not weaken the resistance of the Commission and Supreme Court to 
disclosure of more concrete information regarding the relevant standards 
or reasons for determinations of unsuitability. The October 2009 issue of 
the official journal of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA), 
Jiyū to seigi (Liberty and Justice), contained a special feature on the 
Consultation Commission and lower court appointments.
72
 One of the 
articles undertook a categorization of the reasons for findings of 
unsuitability, based on an ―analysis and review of such cases.‖ 73  The 
reaction of the Commission and Supreme Court to publication of the 
article bordered on outrage.
74
  
At the Commission’s next meeting, a member of the general affairs 
section stated: 
On behalf of the general affairs section for this Commission, we 
gave notice to the JFBA that this report was written in such a way 
as to give rise to the mistaken impression that the internal 
deliberations and materials of this Commission had been obtained 
and analyzed. We expressed the view that this may cause candidates 
unnecessary concern and distress and may undermine trust in this 
Commission.
75
  
In response, the general affairs section continued, the JFBA said the article 
was based on ―comprehensive, rational conjectures and assessments based 
on general guidelines for case disposition, etc., information from lawyers, 
and the like, and there was no breach of confidentiality by any 
Commission member,‖ and pledged that, in the future, the JFBA would 
exercise care to avoid any concern over breach of confidentiality or giving 
mistaken impressions to judges.
76
 Notwithstanding this explanation, the 
summarized minutes report:  
The chair stated that he found it deplorable that [actions of this sort] 
should give rise to suspicions regarding breaches of confidentiality 
 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. 60 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, no. 10 (2009).  
 73. Kimura, supra note 53.  
 74. Summarized Minutes, supra note 48 (Meeting No. 40 (Dec. 1, 2009)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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and should lead to a loss of faith in the Commission. The members 
of the Commission all joined in expressing the view that this 
constitutes a decisively important matter for securing trust in this 
Commission by candidates and those who provide information to 
us, and reconfirmed the need for prudence and caution to avoid any 
suspicions in this regard.
77
  
What, one might ask, was the content of the article that caused so much 
consternation? The article did not refer to any concrete cases. Nor did it 
seek to specify the level of attainment candidates were expected to meet 
with regard to any of the factors identified, although the author did state, 
―While it depends on the case, it seems candidates who are deficient in 
multiple respects or are seriously deficient in one relevant respect are 
being deemed unsuitable.‖ 78  Otherwise, the section of the article in 
question consisted solely of lists of factors that ―had been identified‖ as 
reasons for findings of unsuitability. With respect to candidates for initial 
appointment as assistant judges, the entire list is as follows:  
(1) Bad grades at the LTRI: Below average 
(2) Problems regarding character/judgment: Poor attitude in training 
period 
(3) Problems with regard to suitability as judges.
79
  
With respect to reappointments, the entire list is as follows: 
(1) Insufficient ability: case backlog, practical ability below norm 
(2) Lack of capacity: arrogance toward parties, inappropriate 
statements; dictatorial case management; neglect of duties, lack of 
motivation; indecisiveness; lack of personal objectivity, lack of 
cooperativeness 
(3) Misconduct: commingling of public and private 
(4) Absence of prospects for improvement with respect to the 
preceding three items 
(5) Health problems: mental trouble; grave illness.
80
 
 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Kimura, supra note 53, at 23. 
 79. Id. at 24. 
 80. Id. at 23–24. The article also included a list of factors implicated in findings of unsuitability 
for lawyers seeking appointment to the judiciary. That topic lies beyond the scope of this essay.  
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One can understand why the judiciary might be sensitive about some of 
the items on these lists. The reference to health problems and mental 
trouble, for example, might give rise to questions about stress or whether 
the judiciary is doing enough to provide care and accommodation for 
judges with health concerns. Yet the Commission’s own generalized 
statement of standards lists health problems as a relevant factor for 
determinations of suitability, and, as mentioned above, in an earlier 
meeting, the chair himself mentioned health as the type of clear-cut factor 
that could be disclosed without concern.
81
 One can also imagine the 
judiciary would not be pleased with the revelations, unsurprising as they 
may be, that some judges are arrogant toward parties or dictatorial in how 
they handle cases. From the standpoint of the general public, though, it 
surely would come as welcome news to learn the Commission is paying 
due heed to issues of this sort. And, depending on the degree, 
―commingling of public and private‖ raises such serious concerns that the 
Japanese public presumably would not want such conduct to be kept 
hidden behind closed doors. 
The objections of the Commission and Supreme Court to the article do 
not seem to relate to any specific items on the lists. Rather, those bodies 
seem opposed to the very notion of revealing any concrete reasons for 
determinations of unsuitability, beyond the generalized statement of 
standards and the platitudinous phrase ―comprehensive‖ ―assessment of 
the entire person.‖ 82  Moreover, they seem aghast at the thought that 
anyone might suspect the Commission or Supreme Court staff of having 
revealed any specifics of the Commission’s deliberations and reasoning. 
They also seem firmly convinced that the only way someone could 
compose a list of reasons for determinations of unsuitability would be by 
gaining access to information regarding the Commission’s internal 
workings. In sum, just as in 2004, the Commission’s and Supreme Court’s 
understanding even today appears to be that the calls for transparency 
regarding the selection standards are satisfied by the existence of a body—
the Commission itself—for which all the members are sworn to absolute 
secrecy.  
 
 
 81. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
 82. See supra text accompanying notes 71, 74. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In prior works, I have characterized Japan’s judiciary as a ―nameless, 
faceless‖ judiciary.83 That is not literally true, of course. Judges’ names are 
a matter of public record, and news coverage of cases typically includes 
the name of the presiding judge. Moreover, for a few minutes prior to the 
start of courtroom proceedings, the judiciary routinely permits 
photographers from accredited news organizations to shoot still photos and 
videos of the judge or judges sitting silently on the bench; and the print 
media and television frequently use those photos or videos in reporting on 
major cases. Even so, Japanese judges operate in near anonymity. Their 
names may be a matter of public record, but their backgrounds and 
personalities are almost completely unknown to the general public. In 
Japan’s career judiciary, judges typically are transferred every three years, 
so even in relatively close-knit rural regions, judges are likely to move by 
the time residents begin to know who they are.
84
 
This relative anonymity, I have argued, is consistent with the dominant 
ethos of the Japanese judiciary, an ethos of uniformity. People’s trust in 
the judiciary is seen as resting largely on the view (or mythology) that the 
identity of judges does not matter, since procedures and outcomes will be 
the same no matter who the judges are. Within the judiciary, great weight 
is placed on respect for precedent, thereby helping ensure uniformity in 
outcomes. Efforts are also made to standardize matters ranging from size 
of awards and length of sentences to opinion format, writing style, and 
even courtroom design.
85
 In accordance with the view that the identity of 
the judge does not matter, it is even accepted that judges may change 
midway through trials (which often last one or two years or longer, since 
hearings usually are held on a piecemeal basis, with a month or more 
between sessions).
86
 In keeping with the ethos of uniformity, individual 
differences among judges are downplayed and kept out of public view. 
The appointment process comports with this fundamental philosophy, and 
the recent reforms have done little to change the situation. Despite the 
push for transparency, concrete selection standards remain a matter of 
conjecture, and judges still are nearly anonymous. 
 
 
 83. FOOTE, supra note 24. Aspects of the thesis are discussed in Daniel H. Foote, Restrictions on 
Political Activity by Judges in Japan and the United States: The Cases of Judge Teranishi and Justice 
Sanders, 8 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 285 (2009). 
 84. Haley, supra note 1, at 102–05.  
 85. See, e.g., FOOTE, supra note 24, at 14–15. 
 86. Id. at 16–17. 
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